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MORAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE 
AGE OF BUREAUCRACY 
David Luban, * 
Alan Strudler, ** 
and David Wasserman*** 
The ranks of officials in this judiciary system mounted endlessly, so that 
not even the initiated could survey the hierarchy as a whole. And the pro-
ceedings of the Courts were generally kept secret from subordinate offi-
cials, consequently they could hardly ever quite follow in their further 
progress the cases on which they had worked,· any particular case thus 
appeared in their circle of jurisdiction often without their knowing whence 
it came, and passed from it they knew not whither. Thus the knowledge 
derived from a study of the various single stages of the case, the final 
verdict and the reasons for that verdict lay beyond the reach of these 
officials. 
- Franz Kafka, The Trial 1 
I. INTRODUCTION: BUREAUCRACY AND NATURAL LAW 
No twentieth-century writer has thought so deeply, or so yearn-
ingly, about natural law as Franz Kafka. Kafka's is a world in which 
we seek desperately to know the natural law that is sovereign in 
human affairs but find that knowledge of the law is withheld from us. 
For this reason, we lead our lives in a state of, if not original sin, then 
original guilt - guilt for violating the law, or perhaps guilt for not 
knowing the law, despite the fact that we wish to know it. 
The Trial is Kafka's greatest elaboration of this theme. Joseph K. 
is arrested for a crime, but he cannot discover what his crime is. He is 
convinced that the arrest is a gigantic misunderstanding, but he is un-
able to bring the inquest to a halt. In the end, he is executed, and 
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1. FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL 133.34 (E.M. Butler rev. definitive ed., Willa Muir & Edwin 
Muir trans., Secker and Warburg 1956) (1925). 
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Kafka leaves us with the distinct impression that Joseph K.'s crime is 
precisely his inability to discover what crime he has been accused of. 
K. never has a formal trial, yet the novel is called The Trial: evi-
dently, K.'s fruitless effort to learn what he is accused of is his trial. 
His execution is therefore just, because Joseph K. lives in a state of 
culpable ignorance. In the remarkable parable that his confessor re-
lates to Joseph K. in the ninth chapter, a man comes to the court of 
justice but is denied admittance. He waits patiently by the gate for 
years, and at the moment of his death learns from the doorkeeper that 
the gate will now be closed forever, for it was never intended for any-
one other than the dying petitioner.2 The law is real, and sovereign in 
human affairs, but forever withheld from us. That is the extremity of 
our condition. 3 
Kafka found the perfect literary image for his legal and theological 
theme in The Trial, and that is the image of bureaucracy. In The 
Trial, the emblem of the protagonist's inability to learn the law is his 
confrontation with a bureaucracy that frustrates and evades his every 
effort to get to the bottom of things, to obtain clarification. Assume a 
hierarchical world, a great chain of being; then take away the pinnacle 
of the hierarchy, leaving only the lower orders who cannot take ulti-
mate responsibility for anything they do. That is the theological situa-
tion that Kafka ponders, but it is also the secular situation of the 
bureaucracy. The everyday experience of the bureaucratic runaround 
- tedious, preposterous, yet with potentially fatal consequences -
gives the word Kafkaesque its common meaning. The epigraph at the 
beginning of this paper encapsulates the Kafkaesque world of bureau-
2. Id. at 238-47. 
3. In the grisly story "In the Penal Colony," condemned prisoners are executed on a torture 
device that slowly inscribes the law they have violated on their bodies with needles. As the 
message takes shape over many hours of suffering, recognition and understanding gradually grow 
in the prisoners, until finally they attain a kind of spiritual redemption that comes of knowing 
why they are suffering and dying. The officer in charge of the apparatus fervently believes that 
this form of punishment alone satisfies the requirements of justice. Faced with the imminent 
abolition of this form of execution on humanitarian grounds, the despairing officer climbs into 
the apparatus himself, programming it to carve "Be Just" on his body. But the machine disinte-
grates; instead of writing "Be Just," the needles merely punch the officer to pieces, and the dead 
officer's face "was as it had been in life; no sign was visible of the promised redemption; what the 
others had found in the machine the officer had not found." FRANZ KAFKA, In the Penal Col-
ony, in SELECTED SHORT STORIES OF FRANZ KAFKA 126 (Willa Muir & Edwin Muir trans., 
1952). 
Like The Trial, the story may be read as a comment on natural law - law that is so much a 
part of the human condition that it must be harrowed into our bodies when we transgress it. 
This is, evidently, an outward emblem of the fact that the law already dwells in our nature -
and, perhaps, that it dwells in our nature cruelly. In Kafka's parable, it is the officer, the one 
remaining believer in this law, who alone is denied the redemption it promises - redemption 
that is meant to come through ultimate knowledge of natural law engraved in one's own body. 
The officer represents the predicament of the natural lawyer who understands that natural law 
binds us but, for whatever reason, cannot discover what it asks of him. 
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cracy. It exaggerates, but only slightly, a phenomenon that all of us 
recognize at once. 
Within our collective imagination, evidently, bureaucracy and nat-
ural law are antithetical to each other; otherwise, Kafka's imagery 
would not seem so perfectly appropriate. We begin our own argument 
by attempting to vindicate this perception. We believe that the perva-
siveness of the bureaucratic phenomenon in contemporary life threat-
ens to make natural law irrelevant to our political and economic 
institutions. 
In its classical form, the key idea of natural law is that legal sys-
tems are legitimately instituted in order to promote the common good. 
Propositions of natural law impose constraints on precepts of positive 
law: if a precept of positive law is not instituted to promote the com-
mon good, it lacks legitimacy - it is not law. 
Natural law principles are thus, in the first instance, criteria for 
assessing systems of positive law. However, natural law theory also 
offers important insights into the dimensions of individual moral and 
legal responsibility. The natural law understanding oflegal systems as 
cooperative efforts to promote the common good implies a moral rela-
tion between those who govern and those who are governed. The gov-
erned bear a moral obligation to obey the law, provided that the law 
aims at the common good, whereas those who govern possess author-
ity only to the extent that they undertake to promote the common 
good. The two sides of this relation fit together: the citizens' obliga-
tion to obey the law depends on the rulers' undertaking to legislate for 
the common good.4 
This doctrine of individual responsibility on the part of rulers and 
ruled alike has played a prominent role in the development of twenti-
eth-century international law. Positivism, including legal realism, was 
the ascendant view among legal theorists outside the Catholic Church 
for the century between the 1830s and the 1930s. World War II 
changed that. If there is a single historical event that accounts for the 
revival of serious secular interest in natural law, it is surely the Nu-
remberg trials. The Nuremberg Tribunal held individual Nazi officials 
4. At this point, however, natural law theorists diverge. Philip Soper, for example, contends 
that a good faith belief on the part of the rulers that they are legislating for the common good 
suffices to establish a moral obligation on the part of the ruled to obey the law. PHILIP SOPER, A 
THEORY OF LAW 79 (1984). John Finnis, by contrast, believes that positive law's inconsistency 
with the common good undermines the moral obligation to obey, regardless of what the legislator 
may believe. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 351-60 (1980). Thus, the 
notion of "the rulers' undertaking to legislate for the common good" may be understood subjec· 
tively (Soper) or objectively (Finnis). Elsewhere, one of us has criticized Soper's argument. 
David Luban, Conscientious Lawyers for Conscientious Lawbreakers, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 793, 
806-09 (1991). 
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responsible for acts that positive law did not forbid at the time they 
were committed - so-called "crimes against peace" and "crimes 
against humanity."5 Anticipating the defendants' protest that they 
were merely following official orders that carried the force of positive 
law, Article 8 of the Nuremberg Charter specifically provided that 
"[t]he fact that the defendant acted pursuant to an order of his govern-
ment or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility."6 
That Article 8 represents a fiat-out rejection of what might be 
called the positivist excuse for atrocious official acts - the excuse that 
the acts were licensed by positive law - is intuitively clear. As Stan-
ley Paulson has shown, the defense at Nuremberg relied extensively 
upon the positivist excuse, which the Tribunal had little difficulty re-
jecting. 7 The natural law argument that unjust laws lose their obliga-
tory character provides a straightforward philosophical justification 
for Article 8. Similarly, appeals to natural law clearly form the most 
obvious justification for criminalizing "murder, extermination, en-
slavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts ... whether or not in 
violation of domestic law of the country where perpetrated."8 Such 
crimes against humanity are radically inconsistent with the common 
good, and any domestic legal system that permits them must violate 
natural law. In addition, Article 7 of the Charter eliminated the act-
of-state defense on the part of those in command positions,9 thereby 
recognizing that those who legislate bear moral responsibilities just as 
surely as do those who follow orders. 
Indeed, the view that the Nazi era exposes the moral deficiency of 
positivism compared with natural law is a commonplace. As early as 
the mid-1940s, Gustav Radbruch, an eminent pre-War German posi-
tivist, repudiated positivism and embraced natural law, arguing in sev-
eral influential essays that positivism had disarmed German jurists in 
the face ofNazism. 10 Thus, international revulsion at the official crim-
5. For an argument that the criminalization of crimes against peace and crimes against hu-
manity represented a legal novelty, see David Luban, The Legacies of Nuremberg, 54 Soc. RES. 
779, 797-801 (1987). 
6. 1 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS 
BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 12 (1947). 
7. Stanley L. Paulson, Classical Legal Positivism at Nuremberg, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 132 
(1975). 
8. CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL art. 6(c) (defining crimes 
against humanity). 
9. See CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL art. 7. 
10. See GUSTAV RADBRUCH, Five Minutes of Legal Philosophy. in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
109, 109-10 (Joel Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds., Stanley L. Paulson trans., 3d ed. 1980) (1950) 
(translating Gusr Av RAD BRUCH, Fiinf Minuten Rechtsphi{.osophie, in RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE 335, 
335-37); GUSTAV RADBRUCH, Gesetzliches Unrecht und Ubergesetzliches Recht [Legal Injustice 
and Supralegal Justice], in RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE, supra, at 347. Radbruch's arguments proved 
2352 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 90:2348 
inality of Hitler's regime, as manifested legally in the Nuremberg tri-
als, represents a triumph for natural law thinking. 11 At the very least, 
this worldwide condemnation provisionally lays to rest the positivist 
excuse in international law.12 
But the excuse that "I was only following orders," or "I was only 
doing my job," was not the only one offered by those implicated in 
Nazi crimes. In the aftermath of World War II, the world heard with 
equal frequency the cry, "I didn't know!" This is the epistemological 
excuse, whose elements present the problem that will occupy our at-
tention in this article. Though it is often insincere, and seldom en-
tirely persuasive, the epistemological excuse seems to come naturally 
to those who commit wrongs in a bureaucratic setting. We shall argue 
(1) that bureaucracies function (often by design) to permit their func-
tionaries to truthfully plead the excuse "I didn't know!"; (2) that 
traditional accounts of moral responsibility typically recognize this 
epistemological excuse; and (3) that it is therefore very difficult to find 
a workable account of moral responsibility within bureaucratic institu-
tions. The strength and prevalence of the epistemological excuse may 
render the historic rejection of the positivist excuse an empty or very 
partial victory. 
We cannot overemphasize the importance of this point, for per-
haps the single most salient characteristic of the Nazi crimes was their 
bureaucratic nature. They were committed, not by a lawless gang of 
criminals, but by a regularly functioning state bureaucracy executing 
official policies.13 Not only Nazi crimes have this bureaucratic charac-
ter - it exists as well in the misdeeds of the recently departed regimes 
of the Soviet empire. The emerging democracies of Eastern Europe -
if democracies are what they prove to be - are beginning to come to 
grips with the bureaucratic crimes committed for generations by offi-
influential in English-language jurisprudence, largely through the prominent place they occupied 
in the well-known Hart-Fuller debate. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law 
and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REv. 593, 615-21 (1958); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law 
-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REv. 630, 646-47 (1958). More recently, however, 
Ingo Miiller has criticized Radbruch's view, arguing that the worst perversions of justice in the 
Third Reich occurred because the Nazi judges were not good enough positivists - they were too 
willing to pervert the law for political reasons. See INGO MOLLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE (Deborah 
L. Schneider trans., 1991). This critique, of course, does not affect the argument that Nuremberg 
law represents a repudiation of positivism, nor does it render the positivist excuse acceptable. 
11. For an argument that the Nuremberg Charter did not go far enough in this direction 
because it safeguarded the principle of national sovereignty, the linchpin of positivism, see 
Luban, supra note 5, at 780-90. 
12. Regrettably, the acquittal of Oliver North suggests that the excuse lives on in American 
criminal law. 
13. Rhetorical references to the Nazis as gangsters, criminals, or the like often obscure this 
important point. See Luban, supra note 5, at 817-20. 
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cials of their former regimes, many of whom will surely enter the epis-
temological excuse. Czech novelist Milan Kundera poses the problem 
directly in The Unbearable Lightness of Being: 
Let us concede that a Czech public prosecutor in the early fifties who 
called for the death of an innocent man was deceived by the Russian 
secret police and the government of his own country. But now that we 
all know the accusations to have been absurd and the executed to have 
been innocent, how can that selfsame public prosecutor defend his purity 
of heart by beating himself on the chest and proclaiming, My conscience 
is clear! I didn't know!l4 
One might respond with an equally rhetorical question: how can 
the prosecutor be blamed if he truly did not know? Kundera's rage 
clearly stems from the ready availability of the epistemological excuse 
within the secretive Communist bureaucracies, but the fact that an 
excuse is a bit too handy does not in itself undercut its viability. Thus, 
the problem of bureaucratic irresponsibility faces post-Communist so-
cieties much as it faced post-Nazi Germany. 
Bureaucratic evasion of responsibility, however, is not a pathology 
confined to police states. A recent article in The Washington Post de-
scribes the loss of six million dollars of the savings of Washington area 
Hispanic8 when the unregulated Latin Investment Corporation failed. 
When depositors blamed lax regulation, a D.C. politician responded 
that no one in government was to blame. "Frankly, I think the re-
sponsibility belonged to several agencies, including federal agencies 
.... Thus, effectively, the responsibility belonged to no one."15 The 
bureaucratic evasion of responsibility is as American as your failing 
neighborhood bank. · 
Nor is bureaucratic irresponsibility a pathology limited to govern-
ments. All of us live our lives in the sway of many nongovernmental 
bureaucracies - HM Os, business· corporations, large employers, and 
the like - that function as "private governments" (and often as re-
markably autocratic ones).16 Particularly now, when the erstwhile so-
cialist nations of central and eastern Europe have committed 
themselves to programs of privatization and capitalism, and their mas-
sive bureaucracies prepare to shift allegiance from the state to private 
owners, the danger of bureaucratic evasion inherent in private govern-
ments as well as public should be clear. The problem of individual 
14. MILAN KUNDERA, THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF BEING 177 (Michael H. Heim 
trans., 1984). 
15. Charlene Drew Jarvis, D.C. Council Member, quoted in Carlos Sanchez, A Year Later, 
Depositors Still Waiting, Hoping. WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 1991, at B3. 
16. See Stuart Macaulay, Private Government, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 445 
(Leon Lipson & Stanton Wheeler eds., 1986). 
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responsibility within bureaucratic institutions straddles the divide be-
tween private and public. 
Natural law theories have functioned in the twentieth century to 
strip away the positivist excuse for official wrongdoing. This will be a 
hollow triumph, however, if in the end official malefactors may fall 
back on the epistemological excuse. As bureaucratic institutions in-
creasingly come to pervade modem life, the contrast between natural 
law and positivism threatens to become moot unless a meaningful con-
ception of individual responsibility within organizational settings can 
be formulated. 
A more direct reason exists to explain the tension between natural 
law and the bureaucratic phenomenon, which drastically expands the 
availability of the epistemological excuse. Natural law, remember, in-
sists that institutions are legitimate only when they aim to promote the 
common good. The common good includes, of course, the prosperity, 
stability, solidarity, and liberty of the community. But that cannot be 
the end of the story. Surely one central aspect of the common good 
lies in what we might call the moral intelligibility of our lives. A com-
munity is worse off to the extent that its members are unable to make 
moral sense of the lives that they and their fellow citizens lead. Moral 
intelligibility enhances the sense of meaningfulness and mutual assur-
ance in a community, whereas moral opacity undermines it. 
The Kafkaesque world of bureaucracy is morally opaque. That 
Kafka's world often seems to have the character of a bad dream in its 
combination of tedium, oppressiveness, and withheld meaning is no 
accident. As the passage we have taken as our epigram suggests, the 
horror of the bureaucratic process lies not in officials' mechanical ad-
herence to duty, but rather in the individual's ignorance of what the 
fulfillment of his or her duty may entail. Everyone operates in an epis-
temological and therefore moral vacuum. Interestingly, it was the 
epistemological excuse, not the positivist excuse, that captured 
Kafka's imagination in The Trial. Though one might interpret the 
epistemological theme of The Trial as our inability to know the natu-
ral law, another interpretation is equally plausible: We all know what 
the natural law commands, but because of the way we lead our lives, 
and the institutions within which we live them, we never know 
whether we have transgressed it. The individual actions that make up 
our lives have become ciphers, action shards whose moral character 
we - like Joseph K. - are unable to determine. 
In its stringency, Kafka's moral vision is an optimistic one. 
Though we may wish to plead the epistemological excuse, in Kafka's 
world we do so to no avail. This may be wishful thinking. As 
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Kundera recognizes, the problem in the world we live in is not that the 
epistemological excuse fails, but that it may succeed all too well. 
Thus, the moral relationship between those who rule and those who 
are ruled dissolves, and natural law threatens to recede into the realm 
of useless abstraction. If bureaucracy indeed installs the epistemologi-
cal excuse as a standing option in our moral lives, then bureaucratic 
institutions make a mockery of natural law ideals. 
In this article, we shall examine the sources of the epistemological 
excuse and the moral resources available for restricting its ~pplication. 
Our topic, then, is the often-noticed but poorly understood fragmenta-
tion of knowledge and responsibility in large organizations, including 
government, business corporations, and professional groups. We wish 
to investigate the compartmentalization, mutual buckpassing, and 
deniability that too often leads organizations to commit wrongs for 
which no individual in the organization seems genuinely responsible. 
Bureaucratic organizations parcel out morally significant knowl-
edge among various individuals along the same lines as organizational 
tasks. The division of labor is equally a division of knowledge. Super-
visors may not know of wrongful actions by subordinates implement-
ing management decisions, while subordinates may believe they have 
been left no discretion and no alternatives. Put these conditions to-
gether and you have a recipe for organizational wrongdoing that will 
never trouble the conscience of anyone within the organization. Indi-
viduals within the organization do not know, or perhaps do not want 
to know, what their actions add up to. 
Recent psychological and sociological research on wrongdoing in 
organizations has examined the pressures individuals feel from their 
superiors, their peers, and the norms of corporate culture to engage in 
wrongful conduct. This research has yielded profound insight into the 
subtle but powerful coercive forces at work in organizations. It has 
not paid sufficient attention, however, to the cognitive aspects of obe-
dience and conformity, the structural features of large organizations 
that prevent individuals from obtaining the knowledge they need to 
make informed moral decisions and resist pressure to obey and con-
form. Individuals in organizations frequently lack awareness of the 
role their acts play in the larger corporate undertaking; their igno-
rance complicates both the moral assessment of and the practical re-
sponse to the wrongs they help commit. Analyzing the problem of 
fragmented knowledge (as we shall call it) is critical for an adequate 
philosophical analysis of organizational wrongdoing and for an effec-
tive practical response to it. 
We contend that traditional accounts of morality have failed to 
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deal adequately with the problem of fragmented knowledge, in part 
because they treat the problem as peripheral rather than central, in 
part because they take too narrow and episodic a view of moral deci-
sionmaking. We contend that fragmented knowledge in bureaucratic 
organizations is one of the central moral problems of our time and that 
an adequate response to this problem requires us to broaden the scope 
of moral prescription and appraisal. 
II. BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM 
The bureaucratic fragmentation of knowledge and dilution of re-
sponsibility are pervasive phenomena in modem society. To set the 
stage for our analysis, we first describe the scope of the problem and 
briefly review some of the research, commentary, and debate it has 
provoked. We conclude this background section by discussing the re-
search most relevant to our own concerns, the Milgram studies of de-
structive obedience to authority. 
A. The Collectivization of the Workplace 
Most work in modem society is done by organizations: corpora-
tions, governments, hospitals, foundations, universities, accounting 
firms, armies. Even such supposedly independent professionals as 
physicians and lawyers practice in large organizations to an ever-in-
creasing extent. The HMO has replaced the family physician, and the 
new graduates of today's law schools join firms, of which the largest 
now employ over a thousand lawyers, rather than hanging out a shin-
gle. The problems of professional and business ethics have thus be-
come the problems of supervisors and subordinates in organizational 
settings. Indeed, in a culture such as ours, where our first question to 
each other is often not "How do you do?" but "What do you do?", the 
ethics of the workplace has enormous impact on how we think of mo-
rality in general. To a great extent, ethics in the organizational setting 
has come to define ethics as a whole. We speak of team players and 
loose cannons, leaders and followers, as categories of moral judgment 
and not simply of social description. 
B. The Organization Man and the Other-Directed Society 
The transformation of the workplace appears to have wrought a 
transformation in values, replacing individual responsibility and inter-
nal norms with group identification and external norms. As the post-
war American economy assumed its contemporary form, several 
leading social scientists and commentators explored the psychology of 
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"The Organization Man," in the famous title of William H. Whyte's 
book. Whyte used this term to describe "the ones of our middle class 
who have left home, spiritually as well as physically, to take the vows 
of organization life."17 He ascribed to them the "Social Ethic," which 
includes "a belief in the group as the source of creativity" as well as "a 
belief in 'belongingness' as the ultimate need of the individual."18 
David Riesman described middle-class Americans as a "Lonely 
Crowd," and elaborated a famous typology of characters. In Ries-
man's scheme, people of premodem societies were tradition-directed, 
and the sanction for deviation was shame,· in early modem societies 
people were inner-directed, guided by an internal moral compass, ac-
quired in childhood, which induces guilt when one deviates. In con-
temporary society, however, we have become other-directed: our 
"contemporaries are the source of direction for the individual . . . . 
[T]he process of paying close attention to the signals from others ... 
remain[s] unaltered throughout life."19 For other-directed individu-
als, the sanction for deviance has changed: "As against guilt-and-
shame controls, though of course these survive, one prime psychologi-
cal lever of the other-directed person is a diffuse anxiety. "20 Sociolo-
gist Robert Jackall conducted interviews with 143 managers in several 
contemporary American corporations. In the anxiety-ridden world of 
middle management, "[m]anagers have a myriad of aphorisms that re-
fer to how the power of CEOs, magnified through the zealous efforts of 
subordinates, affects them .... [One such maxim is] "When he 
sneezes, we all catch colds" . . .. 21 Jackall comments: 
As a result, independent morally evaluative judgments get subordinated 
to the social intricacies of the bureaucratic workplace. Notions of mo-
rality that one might hold and indeed practice outside the workplace ... 
become irrelevant . . . . Under certain conditions, such notions may even 
become dangerous. For the most part, then, they remain unarticulated 
lest one risk damaging crucial relationships with significant individuals 
or groups.22 
C. Historical Perspective 
The collectivization of the workplace and the threat it poses to 
traditional moral values are hardly new phenomena; they have been 
17. WILLIAM H. WHYTE, JR., THE ORGANIZATION MAN 3 (1956). 
18. Id. at 7. 
19. DAVID RIESMAN, THE LoNELY CROWD 22 (1950) (emphasis omitted). 
20. Id. at 26. 
21. ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS 22 
(1988). 
22. Id. at 105. 
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recognized, and lamented, for the past 150 years. The erosion of indi-
vidual responsibility and the evils of bureaucracy have engaged con-
servative writers since the advent of the industrial revolution. Over a 
century ago, Karl Marx likewise criticized what he called "the real 
mindlessness of the state." "The bureaucracy is a circle from which 
no one can escape," Marx contended. "The highest point entrusts the 
understanding of particulars to the lower echelons, whereas these, on 
the other hand, credit the highest with an understanding in regard to 
the universal; and thus they deceive one another."23 In 1932, Rein-
hold Niebuhr wrote his classic treatise Moral Man and Immoral Soci-
ety, in which he argued that 
[i]ndividual men may be moral . . . . They are endowed by nature with a 
measure of sympathy and consideration for their kind, the breadth of 
which may be extended by an astute social pedagogy . . . . But all these 
achievements are more difficult, if not impossible, for human societies 
and social groups. In every human group there is less reason to guide 
and to check impulse, less capacity for self-transcendence, less ability to 
comprehend the needs of others and therefore more unrestrained egoism 
than the individuals, who compose the group, reveal in their personal 
relationships. 24 
Niebuhr's argument recognizes that the increasing organization of so-
ciety will be accompanied by a dilution of morality. 
As we have already observed, the problems Marx and Niebuhr dis-
cussed in a theoretical vein came to life in the most horrible way possi-
ble during World War II, where ostensibly civilized human beings 
tortured and slaughtered twelve million men, women, and children in 
extermination camps. The names of the camps - Auschwitz, Treb-
linka, Majdanek - have become synonymous with the incomprehen-
sible willingness of ordinary human beings to do anything, no matter 
how atrocious, when ordered to do so by those in authority. Here, 
again, an explanation may be offered in terms of the division of respon-
sibility within groups. Consider a historian's description of the eutha-
nasia program Hitler ordered to eliminate mentally retarded, 
handicapped, or genetically ill Germans (individuals Hitler called 
"useless eaters"): 
The euthanasia program ... demonstrated how, through fragmentation 
of authority and tasks, it was possible to fashion a murder machine. 
Hitler had enunciated an offhand, extralegal decree, and had not wanted 
to be bothered about it again. Brandt had ordered the "scientific" imple-
mentation of the program and, like Hitler, wished to hear no complaints. 
The directors and personnel of institutions rationalized that matters 
23. KARL MARX, CRmQUE OF HEGEL'S "PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT" 46-47 (Joseph O'Malley 
ed., Annette Jolin & Joseph O'Malley trans., 1970). 
24. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY xi-xii (rev. ed. 1960). 
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were out of their hands and that they were just filling out questionnaires 
... , though in reality each form was the equivalent of a death warrant 
.... The personnel at the end of the line excused themselves on the basis 
that they were under compulsion, had no power of decision, and were 
merely performing a function. Thousands of people were involved, but 
each considered himself nothing but a cog in the machine and reasoned 
that it was the machine, not he, that was responsible. 25 
The horrors of Nazism are without parallel, but the bureaucratic pat-
tern of organization that fragments the knowledge required for moral 
decisionmaking is common to large institutions throughout contempo-
rary society. Jackall describes the typical corporate structure in terms 
not unlike those Marx used to characterize "the real mindlessness of 
the state": 
Power is concentrated at the top in the person of the chief executive 
officer (CEO) and is simultaneously decentralized; that is, responsibility 
for decisions and profits is pushed as far down the organizational line as 
possible. 
. . . [P]ushing details down protects the privilege of authority to de-
clare that a mistake has been made .... Moreover, pushing down details 
relieves superiors of the burden of too much knowledge, particularly 
guilty knowledge. 
. . . [Middle managers] become the "point men" of a given strategy 
and the potential "fall guys" when things go wrong.26 
Hannah Arendt described the bureaucratic phenomenon as a novel 
form of governance appearing alongside the classical distinction 
among rule by one (monarchy), rule by "the best" (aristocracy), rule 
by the few (oligarchy), and rule by the many (democracy). She wrote 
of 
the latest and perhaps most formidable form of ... dominion: bureau-
cracy or the rule of an intricate system of bureaus in which no men, 
neither one nor the best, neither the few nor the many, can be held re-
sponsible, and which could be properly called rule by Nobody. (If, in 
accord with traditional political thought, we identify tyranny as govern-
ment that is not held to give account of itself, rule by Nobody is clearly 
the most tyrannical of all, since there is no one left who could even be 
asked to answer for what is being done. It is . . . impossible to localize 
responsibility and to identify the enemy .... )27 
Such rumors of the demise of responsibility may be exaggerated; yet 
Arendt's description has the ring of familiarity. A graphic contempo-
25. ROBERT E. CONOT, JusncE AT NUREMBERG 210-11 (1983). 
26. JACKALL, supra note 21, at 17, 20-21. 
27. HANNAH ARENDT, ON VIOLENCE 38-39 (1970). 
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rary analogue appeared in litigation surrounding the Dalkon Shield. 
In his opinion, Federal Judge Frank Theis angrily noted: 
The project manager for Dalkon Shield explains that a particular ques-
tion should have gone to the medical department, the medical depart-
ment representative explains that the question was really the bailiwick of 
the quality control department, and the quality control department rep-
resentative explains that the project manager was the one with the au-
thority to make a decision on that question. . . . [I]t is not at all unusual 
for the hard questions posed in Dalkon Shield cases to be unanswerable 
by anyone from Robins [the manufacturer].28 
One must not be naive, of course: often the defense of fragmented 
knowledge will be entered falsely and cynically, as a form of liability 
screening. Executives in the hot seat should be treated with the same 
skepticism that greeted German officials who "didn't know."29 De-
spite this healthy skepticism, however, we remain convinced that frag-
mented knowledge is a genuine phenomenon that we cannot simply 
dismiss as a lame excuse. 
D. The Psychology of Destructive Obedience 
Social scientists have labored to understand the Holocaust and to 
answer the all-important question whether it could occur in other set-
tings. Stanley Milgram conducted perhaps the most significant - and 
certainly the most famous - experimental studies to address this is-
sue. Milgram's experiments underscore our thesis because they illus-
trate the ways in which social and institutional pressures to obey 
reinforce, and are reinforced by, the fragmentation of knowledge in 
modern bureaucracies and other large organizations. 
In Milgram's experiments, volunteers in a Yale University experi-
ment were ordered by the experimenter to administer gradually in-
creasing electric shocks to another "subject" (actually a confederate of 
the experimenter), ostensibly to study the effect of punishment on 
learning. As the "shocks" increased in intensity, the confederate dis-
played increasing discomfort, dem~nded that the experiment stop, 
screamed with pain, complained of a heart condition, and finally fell 
silent as if he were unconscious. 30 In this original experiment, sixty-
five percent of the subjects went all the way, administering the highest 
possible, potentially lethal, level of shock. Those subjects who admin-
28. In re A.H. Robins Co. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 575 F. Supp. 71~, 724 
(D. Kan. 1983). 
29. John Braithwaite, Passing the Buck for Corporate Crime, AUSTL. SocY., Apr. 1991, at 3, 
3. 
30. See STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 3-4 
(1974). 
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istered the maximum shock expressed great discomfort at the cruel 
task they were assigned; many of them berated the experimenter, pro-
tested, or insisted that they would not proceed with the experiment -
all the while continuing to :flip the switches. 
Milgram conducted a number of important variations on the origi-
nal experiment, several of which suggest the role that incomplete and 
fragmented knowledge may play in facilitating destructive obedience 
and the abdication of individual responsibility.31 In one version, the 
experiment was removed from the anxiety-relieving auspices of Yale to 
a seedy-looking storefront operation in nearby Bridgeport. Less able 
to reassure themselves that the experimenters knew what they were 
doing, fifty-three percent of the subjects refused to go all the way.32 
This suggests that compliant subordinates often believe that their 
qualms are merely the result of incomplete understanding, and assume 
that those in charge have good reasons for what they are doing. 
The rate of compliance also declined when the subject could see 
the victim, and declined even further when the subject was actually 
required to hold the victim's hand on the contact-plate. In this latter 
version of the experiment, seventy percent of the subjects stopped 
before administering the maximum level of shock. 33 
While these levels of resistance are hardly comforting, they do sug-
gest that individuals will be less willing to follow immoral orders when 
the consequences of obedience are less ambiguous. One striking varia-
tion on Milgram "simulated a bureaucratic hierarchy by dividing the 
teacher's role among two people: a 'transmitter' and an 'execu-
tant.' " 34 Executants, who administered the shock, resisted signifi-
cantly more often than transmitters, who merely informed the 
executor when to deliver a shock, although the executants were under 
at least as much pressure to obey. 
As Kelman and Hamilton note in discussing this variation, sub-
jects' resistance to obedience is often weakened 
by the ... ability to avoid seeing the connection between their own ac-
tions and the destructive consequences of those actions. The Nazi exter-
mination program was carried out by a vast bureaucracy in which many 
functionaries - from Adolph Eichmann down to junior clerks - sat at 
desks, shuffled papers, arranged train schedules, and carried out a vari-
31. More recently, Herbert Kelman and Lee Hamilton have offered a detailed psychological 
analysis of the dynamics of obedience and the social structures that contribute to it. See HER-
BERT C. KELMAN & V. LEE HAMILTON, CRIMES OF OBEDIENCE: TOWARD A SOCIAL PSY-
CHOLOGY OF AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY (1989). 
32. MILGRAM, supra note 30, at 61. 
33. Id. at 35. 
34. KELMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 31, at 165. 
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ety of other tasks without having to consider the final product of their 
efforts.35 
Seeing the connection between one's action and its destructive conse-
quences clearly has a strong emotional component, but it also has crit-
ical cognitive significance; it removes any doubts about the effe9t of the 
individual's obedience. 
Another form of ignorance that appears to have played a signifi-
cant role in Milgram's experiments was the absence of a clear-cut mo-
ment of decision. Few subjects would have hesitated to give a mild, 
tingling shock; most probably would have refused to give an initial 
shock of maximum voltage. The gradual escalation of voltage was in-
sidious because it deprived subjects of an obvious stopping point, en-
couraging them to defer resistance until they saw themselves as 
committed, or as compromised. This kind of slippery slope may char-
acterize many of the decisions made in contemporary organizations. 
Another variant of the Milgram experiments, however, provides 
some encouragement that resistance and reform may be possible in 
organizational settings. In this study, the subject was assigned to a 
team administering the shocks, while the other team members were 
really confederates of the experimenter. Milgram discovered that 
compliance was extraordinarily sensitive to peer pressure. When the 
other team members refused to proceed with the experiment, only ten 
percent of the subjects remained obedient to the experimenter and 
"went all the way." Conversely, when a teammate rather than the 
subject took charge of physically administering the shock, 92.5% of 
the subjects went along with the experiment up to the maximum 
shock. 36 In Niebuhr's terms, we may think of moral man made less 
moral by an immoral society, but more moral by a society of his 
betters. 
While there are obviously other factors at work, we believe that in 
this experiment the compliance or resistance of others served an im-
portant cognitive function. As Kelman and Hamilton argue, "[t]he 
most important effect of the confederates' disobedience ... was proba-
bly in providing the cognitive and motivational conditions that al-
lowed the participant to redefine the situation in which he found 
himself."37 
The Milgram studies, then, suggest the role of imperfect and frag-
mented knowledge in organizational misconduct. The less individuals 
appreciate the consequences of their acts, the need to decide, and the 
35. Id. 
36. MILGRAM, supra note 30, at 119. 
37. KELMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 31, at 160. 
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available alternatives, the easier it will be for them to engage in de-
structive obedience. Milgram's experiments suggest that the fragmen-
tation of knowledge promotes organizational wrongdoing by blunting 
the edge of moral conflict. 
Although Milgram's research focused on subordinates, parallel 
problems arise for supervisors. As we have seen, bureaucratic struc-
tures serve to deny supervisors knowledge of operational details, blunt 
their awareness of harsh consequences, and help them rationalize what 
they cannot ignore. The result is the deep paradox of the "rule by 
Nobody": when neither superiors nor subordinates may be held re-
sponsible, we face an uncanny situation in which responsibility has 
seemingly been conjured out of existence. 
E. The Inadequacy of Ethical Tradition and Philosophical Theory 
Most moral theories take as their central cases the moral choices 
confronting individuals deliberating alone and in full knowledge of the 
morally relevant circumstances - including, indeed, that the choice 
they face is morally charged. Standard moral theories may be viewed, 
in effect, as structures of three concentric circles. At the center lie the 
core precepts, which presuppose full knowledge on the part of agents. 
Limiting these precepts are principles of mitigation, including mitiga-
tion when full knowledge is absent. Qualifying these, in tum, is an 
account of culpable ignorance. The phenomenon of culpable igno-
rance lies at the periphery of concern in such a moral theory, and is 
typically restricted to a small range of exceptional cases. 
Reflection on organizational settings suggests that knowledge and 
ignorance must play a more central role in moral theory. We believe 
that the specter of fragmented knowledge, divided responsibility, am-
biguous orders, and unknown consequences is inadequately addressed 
in the moral discourse of W estem societies. Virtually every approach 
to normative ethics, from the Ten Commandments to the latest wrin-
kles in philosophy journals, focuses primary attention on moral 
problems in which four knowledge conditions are satisfied - knowl-
edge conditions that are frequently absent in individual decisionmak-
ing and almost never found in organizational settings. 
First, the decisionmaker recognizes that he or she has come to a 
fork in the road: The decisionmaker knows that a decision must be 
made. Do I or don't I cheat on the examination? Do I or don't I 
protest when I hear an acquaintance tell an anti-Semitic joke? Situa-
tions such as these are readily identifiable as moral decisions. Typi-
cally, when we face one of these questions, we know that we face it. 
Second, the decisionmaker recognizes that he or she must make the 
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choice in a fairly short, distinct period of time: The decisionmaker 
knows when a decision must be made, or at least by when it must be 
made. The examination is tomorrow; I must confront the acquain-
tance about his anti-Semitic joke now or never. 
Third, the decisionmaker confronts a small number of well-defined 
options: The decisionmaker knows what choices are available. For 
example, a lawyer, learning that her client is using her services to per-
petrate a fraud, can quickly catalogue her options: do what the client 
asks, try to talk the client out of the plan, blow the whistle on the 
client, or resign. 
Fourth, the decisionmaker has the information needed to make the 
decision: The decisionmaker knows what is needed to make the 
choice. Even in situations of radically incomplete information, theo-
ries of rational decisionmaking under uncertainty allow us to assign 
probability-estimates to these various outcomes in order to generate a 
recommendation, though that recommendation may be merely to flip 
a coin. 
These, then, are the four knowledge conditions of moral decision-
making: we know that a decision must be made, when a decision must 
be made, what choices are available, and what is needed to make the 
choice. From the Biblical "Thou shalt not steal" and the Golden 
Rule, to Kant's categorical imperative and the utilitarian injunction to 
achieve the greatest good for the greatest number, the core precepts of 
the major systems of ethical thought are directed to agents who satisfy 
the knowledge conditions. If the conditions are not satisfied, ethical 
systems generally respond with mitigation or even immunity: forgiv-
ing those who "know not what they do" is basic to Western under-
standings of moral responsibility. 
Ignorance can, of course, be culpable; but most philosophers and 
legal theorists who acknowledge the phenomenon of culpable igno-
rance have implicitly confined it to a small range of exceptional cases: 
conspirators who attempt to preserve their deniability, or drunks who 
have wilfully stupefied themselves. The possibility that the modern 
workplace may place millions of ordinary individuals in a state of cul-
pable ignorance throughout their careers has never, to our knowledge, 
been explicitly addressed in moral theory. 
In an organizational setting, one or more of the four knowledge 
conditions typically fails at a critical juncture. As the Milgram experi-
ments illustrated, individuals in bureaucratic settings may not fully 
appreciate that a decision must be made, understand when it should be 
made, realize what choices are open to them, and comprehend what 
the consequences of different choices will be. A law firm associate 
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asked to research a small point of law or a junior architect asked to 
design a detail may have no idea that the project as a whole raises deep 
questions of professional ethics. Even if they have their suspicions, it 
is often impossible to pinpoint a moment of truth when the decision 
must be made. No clear list of options, or even clear understanding of 
who to speak with, may exist, and the subordinate may never believe 
she has sufficient information to fashion a solution. 
The failure of these knowledge conditions is created or maintained 
by organizational structure. Typically, supervisors parcel out subtasks 
to a number of subordinate employees. None of the subordinates may 
have more than the most general idea of what the entire project is 
about, while the supervisor may know nothing about the details of 
each subordinate's subtasks. No member of the organization might 
recognize a moral problem, because the problem arises not from what 
any one member of the team is doing, but rather from all their actions 
put together. The fact that each is merely a member of a team lulls 
them into a sense of security, so that they feel no pressing need to find 
out more about what is going on. Though they may resolve not to be 
"good Germans" at the moment of truth, the moment of truth never 
arrives. 
This, then, is the central philosophical question that the problem 
of fragmented knowledge raises: ls it possible to formulate satisfactory 
principles of individual responsibility when any or all of the four knowl-
edge conditions presupposed by standard moral theories fail? 
Ill. REsPONSIBILITY WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE: FOUR 
APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM 
In this Part, we compare and assess principles of responsibility for 
individuals in organizational settings that may complement existing 
moral systems that presuppose the four knowledge conditions. At bot-
tom, four approaches exist to the problem of "deeds without doers." 
First, we can simply accept as a tragic fact of modern existence that 
organizational wrongs may be committed for which no one - neither 
individuals nor the organization - can rightly be held responsible. 
More optimistically, we can either hold the organization itself morally 
responsible for the wrongdoing or hold all the individuals affiliated 
with the organization strictly liable. Finally, we can extend standard 
principles of culpable ignorance to explain why individuals in organi-
zations may be held responsible for their actions even though the 
knowledge conditions fail. This is the approach we will defend. 
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A. The Skeptical Approach 
Some might argue that "deeds without doers" are a tragic fact of 
modern life. We really do live under the "rule by Nobody'' discussed 
by Hannah Arendt, so assigning responsibility to some individual -
whether a natural or organizational person - is simply an anachro-
nism. This we call the skeptical approach: "skeptical," because it de-
nies that the problem of fragmented knowledge has a solution. 
Various postmodern philosophers and psychologists have suggested 
that the very idea of individual responsibility rests on a discredited 
picture of autonomous subjects or selves making rational choices. 
Thus, Kenneth Gergen asserts in The Saturated Self: "To be sure, 
individuals break the law, but from the postmodern perspective, such 
actions should be attributed not to the individual alone but to the ar-
ray of relationships in which he or she is a part."38 Unlike a corpora-
tion or government, an "array of relationships" does not look even 
superficially like an entity we could meaningfully praise or blame. We 
are left where we began, with deeds that lack doers. 
Under this skeptical view, we can no more condemn organizational 
wrongdoing on moral grounds than we can cancer or AIDS. Suppose 
that an epidemic of an unknown disease rendered the entire human 
race psychotic and homicidal. A great deal of death would result, but 
no one could truly be held accountable. The skeptical, postmodern 
view analogizes bureaucratic organization to this imaginary epidemic. 
The analogy suggests two problems with the skeptical view. First, 
the argument overstates the difficulty of imputing responsibility to in-
dividuals or the organizations to which they belong or help to create. 
Individuals in an organization may be ignorant, confused, anxious, or 
intimidated, but they are not in the grip of an irresistible malady. Bu-
reaucratic organization is not a renegade virus: it results from con-
scious human decisions, and it possesses some of the features of a 
conscious entity that make it susceptible to praise and blame. 
Second, even if the analogy were descriptively correct, the skeptic's 
prescription of passivity or acquiescence would hardly follow. The 
theoretical difficulty of ascribing responsibility for egregious miscon-
duct to individuals or organizations might instead provide a compel-
ling reason for overhauling the basic structure of organizations in 
order to restore accountability. Our working hypothesis amounts to 
what might be dubbed a law of conservation of responsibility: moral 
responsibility for organizational actions cannot and should not be con-
38. KENNETH J. GERGEN, THE SATURATED SELF: DILEMMAS OF IDENTITY IN CONTEM· 
PORARY LIFE 244 (1991). 
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jured out of existence. It must lie with the organization itself, with the 
individuals in the organization, or with the institutions that permit 
responsibility to be endlessly circulated. 
B. Replacing Individual with Organizational Responsibility 
As one alternative, the organization itself could be held responsible 
to precisely the degree that an organizational structure of fragmented 
knowledge absolved individuals within the bureaucracy from responsi-
bility. This approach raises deep philosophical questions about the re-
ality of metaphysical fictions such as organizations and the cogency of 
assigning them moral agency and responsibility. An organization may 
not possess all the characteristics necessary to ascribe agency and re-
sponsibility to it. As Baron Thurlow, Lord Chancellor of England, 
asked in an often quoted question, "Did you ever expect a corporation 
to have a conscience, when it has no soul to be damned, and no body 
to be kicked?"39 
Several philosophers address Baron Thurlow's question, proposing 
different methods for understanding organizations as the kind of entity 
to which responsibility can be ascribed.40 Peter French, for example, 
argues that, because corporations possess personality and decision-
making ability, we must regard them as "members of the moral com-
munity, of equal standing with the traditionally acknowledged 
residents: human beings."41 As French sees it, corporations that 
cause harm are not ordinarily mere causes of harm: they are instead 
persons that may be morally responsible in the same way as human 
beings. Indeed, French holds open the possibility that a corporation 
may be responsible for a harm even though neither its employees nor 
directors have any responsibility for that occurrence.42 Although 
French's view does not imply that organizations must be held respon-
sible to precisely the degree that individuals are absolved from respon-
sibility by an organizational structure of fragmented knowledge, his 
approach at least makes this possibility intelligible. 
Should we agree with French that organizations are morally re-
39. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 550 (3d. ed. 1979). 
40. For an excellent survey of these discussions, see LARRY MAY, THE MORALITY OF 
GROUPS: COLLECTIVE REsPONSIBILITY, GROUP-BASED HARM, AND CORPORATE RIGHTS 
(1987). See also ELIZABETH WOLGAST, ETHICS OF AN ARTIFICIAL PERSON: LoST REsPONSI-
BILITY IN PROFESSIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS (1992). Wolgast's book is one of the best-sus-
tained philosophical efforts to deal with the issues of individual and organizational responsibility 
we are concerned with. She addresses the issue through the concept of role-differentiation rather 
than fragmented knowledge, but her approach and conclusions are in many respects congenial to 
ours. 
41. PETER A. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE REsPONSIBILITY 32 (1984). 
42. Id. at 152, 162. 
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sponsible persons? This question really has two components: first, 
whether organizations are moral persons; second, even if they are not 
moral persons, whether they are still the kind of entity that can be 
morally responsible. If an organization is a moral person, then by defi-
nition it is the kind of entity to which responsibility can be ascribed. 
If, on the other hand, it is an entity other than a person, then the issue 
of whether we can ascribe responsibility to it - and what making that 
ascription would mean - becomes more complex. 
As French initially presented his position, all that is required to be 
a moral person is that one be able to engage in a complex kind of 
decisionmaking that involves making a deliberate choice. A corpora-
tion, he maintained, engages in such decisionmaking when its board of 
directors or managers renders decisions on the corporation's behalf.43 
French's critics responded that many entities that are not moral per-
sons apparently have the ability to engage in intentional decisionmak-
ing.44 A cat may choose after deliberation to kill a mouse, yet it is not 
a moral person. To avoid this problem, French now refines his defini-
tion of moral personhood to require the ability not only to engage in 
intentional decisionmaking but also to change one's conduct in re-
sponse to moral criticism. 45 
We do not believe, however, that even French's revised criterion 
suffices to show that organizations are moral persons. There is more 
than one sense in which one might respond to moral criticism, and not 
all these senses are relevant to the issue of whether one is a person 
morally speaking. Suppose that, observing a cat toying with a mouse, 
you yell, "Fiend!" and the cat runs. In this case the cat would in some 
sense be responding to moral criticism: it responds to your yell, which 
voices a moral criticism. 
Yet plainly the cat would not be responding to the criticism in a 
way that lent credence to the idea that it appreciated the moral signifi-
cance of the criticism. Indeed, one might say that rather than re-
sponding to moral criticism, the cat responded to the simpler 
43. Peter A. French, The Corporation as a Moral Person, 16 AM. PHIL. Q. 207, 213-14 
(1979). 
44. THOMAS DONALDSON, CORPORATIONS AND MORALITY 20-23 (1982); see also Thomas 
Donaldson, Personalizing Corporate Ontology: The French Way, in SHAME, REsPONSIBILITY, 
AND THE CORPORATION 101, 101-12 (Hugh Curtler ed., 1986). For a cogently argued interpre· 
tation of choice and deliberation that would place animals and corporations outside the realm of 
entities that can choose, see ALAN DONAGAN, CHOICE: THE EssENTIAL ELEMENT IN HUMAN 
ACTION (1987). For a view interestingly similar to Donagan's, see Manuel G. Velasquez, Why 
Corporations Are Not Morally Responsible for Anything They Do, 2 Bus. & PROF. ETHICS J., 
Spring 1983, at 7. Velasquez argues that, in order to be a person, one must have the unity of 
consciousness that would allow one to initiate an action, and that corporations lack this charac· 
teristic. Id. at 8-9; see also WOLGAST, supra note 40, at 79-95. 
45. See FRENCH, supra note 41, at 166. 
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phenomenon of angry yelling. In order to respond to moral criticism 
in the relevant sense, one must respond in a way that confirms one's 
understanding of the criticism. At the very least, one's response must 
be animated or informed by an appropriate moral emotion like guilt or 
shame. 
This returns us to Baron Thurlow's objection. If the corporation, 
or any other organization, cannot feel guilt or shame or other suitable 
moral emotions, how can it appreciate the significance of moral criti-
cism? Because the organization lacks heart and soul, it literally feels 
nothing. Lacking the capacity for moral feeling, the organization's re-
sponse to moral criticism may do nothing more to distinguish the or-
ganization as a person than does the reaction of the cat. 
One might respond that the controlling members of the organiza-
tion, perhaps acting in their official capacity, might feel guilt or shame 
on the organization's behalf, and that the possibility of this vicariously 
felt shame should allow us to attribute moral responsibility to the or-
ganization, to blame it, and to certify its credentials as a person. In-
deed, it is not hard to imagine the individual sense of shame being 
deepened by a mutual understanding among members of the organiza-
tion of the shame each person feels. 
Under this view, the fact that the organization feels shame would 
consist in the fact that relevant members of the organization experi-
ence appropriate sentiments of shame for what the organization has 
done. One might thus defend French against Baron Thurlow by hold-
ing that the organization need not have moral sentiments apart from 
those experienced by humans associated with it in order to be a mor-
ally responsible person, any more than it need have conscious exper-
iences of decisionmaking in order to be the kind of entity that makes 
decisions. 
This defense, however, overlooks the difference between the claim 
that the organization feels shame and the claim that the organization 
is a person that feels shame. One can plausibly say that an entity other 
than a person can feel shame. A family, for example, may feel shame 
for what one of its members has done. For it to do so, its members 
must feel shame in a way that shows mutual understanding of the im-
portance of family ties. Is an organization's feeling shame more like 
the family's feeling shame (or some other collective entity's feeling 
shame) than it is like an individual person's feeling shame? We think 
that the answer is yes, and thus that the organization is best under-
stood as a collective entity, not a person. 
To earn the moral status of a person, one must do certain things 
for oneself that an organization must have done for it by others. Con-
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sider what having a thought means. Unless a person herself has a 
thought, she does not think. One person does not have a thought sim-
ply because some other person has a thought. Similarly, outside the 
legal fictions of agency law, one person does not render a decision sim-
ply because another person makes a decision for her, and one person 
does not feel shame simply because another person feels shame for her. 
Because an organization can think, decide, or feel shame only by 
having someone else do these things for it, the organization cannot 
think, decide, or feel shame the way that a person can. At most, the 
organization engages in these mental acts not as a person but as a 
collective entity like a family. Indeed, if the organization were 'a per-
son, all collective entities that had decisionmaking abilities, like fami-
lies, bridge clubs, and law school faculties, would be persons. But it 
would be absurd to suppose that a family that made collective deci-
sions consisted of five persons: the mother, father, two children, and 
the family itself. 46 
Perhaps the organization is a morally responsible entity other than 
a person. Several writers suggest the possibility that many nonper-
sons, including mobs, crowds, and nations, are morally responsible.47 
An organization, conceived of as an entity other than a person, might 
be regarded as morally responsible in at least two ways. Each method 
involves a metaphysical interpretation of the organization. 
First, one might think of the organization as a collective entity 
constituted by its employees and officials, 48 who stand in a distinctive 
relation to one another, somewhat analogous to the way a brick wall is 
made of bricks or a family is constituted by its members. This first 
view holds that the organization is not an entity that can exist apart 
from the individual human beings associated with it, and regards 
blaming the organization as just an indirect way of blaming those 
individuals. 
This view naturally raises the question, why bother? Why not sim-
ply blame the individuals? One obvious answer is that often, when 
organizational activity results in harm, identifying the responsible or-
ganization is much easier than identifying the responsible individuals 
within. Holding the organization responsible may be a way of holding 
responsible individuals within the organization whose identities we 
cannot determine. This tactic makes sense, however, only when we 
46. While we call this implication absurd, there is no reason to think that French would 
agree. 
47. For an illuminating analysis of these issues, see Joel Feinberg, Collective Responsibility, 
65 J. PHIL. 674 (1968). 
48. A sophisticated version of this view is developed in MAY, supra note 40. 
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are reasonably confident that some individuals or other in the organi-
zation really are at fault. It makes sense, that is, only when we are not 
confronted with a case where no individuals are at fault because all of 
them may truthfully plead the epistemological excuse. Thus, blaming 
the organization simply because it is a convenient surrogate for the 
responsible employees makes practical sense only when the problem of 
fragmented knowledge is not the primary issue. This pragmatic ap-
proach consequently ignores the problem of fragmented knowledge 
rather than solving it. 
Second, one might think of the organization as an entity whose 
existence is distinct from that of the human beings associated with it. 
For example, rather than following French in thinking of the corpora-
tion as some weird variety of person, one might, following John Ladd 
and Meir Dan-Cohen, 49 think of the corporation as an entity like a 
machine. Alternatively, one might follow Virginia Held and regard 
the corporation to be something intermediate between a person and a 
machine. so If one accepts the view that an organization is a meta-
physically distinct entity, then one might also follow Held in suppos-
ing that the organization can act even after the humans associated 
with it perish. 
This second view seems odd on the surface for reasons raised by 
Baron Thurlow. To attribute moral responsibility to something is to 
blame it, which involves subjecting it to moral criticism. Yet morally 
criticizing an entity that has no capacity for moral feeling seems point-
less. Some authors nonetheless suggest that certain situations force us 
to recognize the moral responsibility of organizations apart from the 
individuals who comprise them.51 These are cases in which organiza-
tional activity causes harm, no individual associated with the organi-
zation can properly be blamed for the harm, and there is therefore 
nobody but the organization to blame - that is, precisely those cases 
that form our central topic. 
One situation in which the facts supposedly require us to acknowl-
edge the necessity of blaming the organization without blaming indi-
viduals associated with it involves the 1979 crash of an Air New 
49. MEIR DAN·CoHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY FOR 
BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY 46-51 (1986); John Ladd, Morality and the Ideal of Rationality in For-
mal Organizations, 54 THE MONIST 488 (1970). Ladd, however, denies that corporations can be 
morally responsible. Id. at 498-500. 
50. See Virginia Held, Corporations, Persons, and Responsibility, in SHAME, RESPONSIBILITY, 
AND THE CORPORATION, supra note 44, at 161-81. 
51. See FRENCH, supra note 41, at 145-63; Paul B. Thompson, Why Do We Need a Theory of 
Corporate Responsibility?, in SHAME, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE CORPORATION, supra note 44, 
at 115-35. 
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Zealand jet. Frenchs2 and Paul ThompsonsJ argue that while perhaps 
no single individual was responsible for this crash, the airline corpora-
tion was responsible; indeed, these commentators suggest that the cor-
poration's responsibility may arise from facts that, in our terms, 
involve fragmented knowledge. 
The facts are as follows.s4 Air New Zealand flew large jets over 
Antarctica as part of a sightseeing package. The jets would fly at low 
altitude so that the passengers could see the terrain. Apparently, Air 
New Zealand used strange procedures to disseminate information 
about the flight. These procedures fragmented knowledge about the 
details of the flight plan and the obstacles to flight. Air New Zealand's 
flight plans were programmed into on-board computers from a central 
ground computer. There was no practice of including flight crews in 
discussions of changes in the flight plan; hence, pilots were not in-
formed of a flight plan change before the flight occurred. Yet these 
changes put the flight on a collision course with a mountain. The col-
lision killed everyone on the jet. 
Since they believe that Air New Zealand employees acted consci-
entiously, French and Thompson maintain that the responsibility for 
the crash should not be attributed to any individual employee or man-
ager. Instead, they argue, the corporate policy itself was at fault for 
the crash. These authors thus approve of a government report which 
concluded that the cause of the air disaster had an "organizational 
nexus," and that it was wrong to attribute moral responsibility to any 
individual associated with Air New Zealand.ss 
It is difficult to believe that no individual associated with Air New 
Zealand did anything wrong. If the accident occurred because of bad 
corporate policy, then we must wonder whether the person or persons . 
responsible for the policy should also be blamed for the accident. One 
wonders whether those in charge of designing the communication pro-
cedures properly discharged their duties, and if they did not, whether 
doing so would have prevented the accident. In many ways, to sup-
pose that the accident might have occurred despite the fact that all 
involved properly discharged their duties seems a piece of science 
fiction. 
These doubts about the French-Thompson description of the case 
S2. See FRENCH, supra note 41, at 14S-63. 
S3. See Thompson, supra note Sl, at 119-20. 
S4. We rely on the accounts provided in FRENCH, supra note 41, at 14S-S4, and Thompson, 
supra note Sl, at 119-20. 
SS. See FRENCH, supra note 41, at 1S2; Thompson, supra note Sl, at 119-20 (implicitly con-
curring with government report). 
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highlight an important point about the epistemological excuse for or-
ganizational wrongdoing: though we have argued that the excuse may 
be genuine, it is also clear that embattled employees will frequently 
seize on it whether it is genuine or not. This suggests a practical rea-
son to be concerned about shifting blame to the organization. To the 
extent that we assign responsibility to the organization itself rather 
than to its managers, employees, or directors, we protect those individ-
uals from blame. This may encourage managers, employees, and di-
rectors to resort too readily to the epistemological excuse "I didn't 
know" and may even lead them to resurrect the positivist excuse "I 
was only doing my job." The effect may be to diminish the responsi-
bility individuals take for what they do in the firm and to encourage 
individuals to acquiesce in bad and even harmful policy. On the other 
hand, to the extent we hold responsible the individual employee or 
official but not the organization itself, we run a complementary risk: 
we may encourage organizations to treat individual employees as 
scapegoats. When harm is caused by corporate structure that has 
careened out of control, something must be done to change that struc-
ture. Picking out individual managers to hold responsible may dis-
tract us from the more important task of institutional reform. 
Let us, then, accept for the sake of argument that even though 
individuals in Air New Zealand bear no responsibility for the crash, 
Air New Zealand itself was responsible. How might this happen? 
Suppose as a bottom-line fact that even though all individuals involved 
worked very hard at getting the relevant information, the structural 
complications were so overwhelming that they were doomed to fail. 
Nobody could have anticipated these complications, so nobody was to 
blame for them. We might say that the accident was somebody's fault 
but not, even to some small degree, the fault of any individual. There-
fore, the corporate structure must have been at fault: the corporate 
structure, and hence the corporation itself, caused the crash. Had that 
corporate structure not been present, a pilot would have been aware of 
the risk of crash, and could have acted to avoid colliding with the 
mountain. But if we concede that the corporation, not an individual, 
caused the crash, are we also forced to admit that the corporation was 
morally responsible for the crash? 
Here again Baron Thurlow enters the picture. That causation is 
not enough for moral responsibility is elementary. Lightning may 
cause a fire in the forest, but it is only causally responsible, not morally 
responsible, for the fire. In the case of lightning, our inability to attri-
bute moral responsibility is of no concern. We are able to understand 
and control the connected phenomena - to protect ourselves from 
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being struck, for example - so long as we understand the relevant 
causal facts. When humans cause harm, the situation is different. To 
get people to avoid harm, we must appeal to their sense of decency and 
duty, to their desire to do nothing for which they should feel guilt or 
shame. Even when we cannot hope to affect the behavior of a respon-
sible person - because, for example, he caused the harm in the past 
and is now dead - we may still benefit from developing explanations 
of what he did in terms of the moral concept of responsibility. Such 
explanations help us hone our understanding of the distinctively 
human causal web. 
While it is plainly important to observe how organizations and or-
ganizational structure cause harm, even to attribute causal responsibil-
ity for a particular harm to organizational structure, we gain nothing 
by going further and talking about the moral responsibility of the 
metaphysically distinct organization. We do not alter an organization 
by appealing to its sense of decency or duty; we do so by appealing to 
the sensibilities of its employees and officials, or, in extreme cases, by 
placing it in receivership. Because the language of moral responsibil-
ity is lost on the metaphysically distinct organization, to use that lan-
guage on the organization cheapens it. 
Hence, even if we resist the temptation to blame the organization 
morally instead of its employees or officials, we need to find another 
variety of responsibility for the organization, a nonmoral variety. In 
finding that the organization or its structure is causally responsible for 
the accident, we need not morally blame it as a metaphysically distinct 
entity, because we need not assert that the organization should have 
acted with a sense of decency or duty or felt guilt or shame for what it 
did. Instead, we cite the organizational structure as a causal factor 
that contributed to the accident and that merits our attention for 
change. Thus, by blaming the organization, we can make at least one 
valid point: that, in solving the problem that led to this crash, we 
must do more than admonish or even fire Air New Zealand employees 
who were involved in this crash. We must also change the organiza-
tional structure that led these employees to behave in a manner that 
allowed the crash to occur. This blame, however, is not moral blame. 
It is causal blame, or, more simply, causal citation. 
Beyond organizational structure, another aspect of the organiza-
tion may be a morally important cause of harm: organizational cul-
ture. The difference between structure and culture is straightforward. 
Two organizations with the same structure - that is, the same organi-
zational flow chart and the same written policies - may behave differ-
ently because they have different cultures, different patterns of 
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informal institutional practice and social relations. One organization 
might stress upright behavior, honoring the spirit of laws as well as 
abiding by their letter, putting safety before profits, and frowning on 
backbiting and internal politicking among middle management. An-
other might stress the bottom line, encourage employees to get away 
with all they can, and applaud personal advancement through dirty 
tricks. We can cogently ascribe moral terms to these cultures. We can 
find one decent and the other reprehensible. 
Does this distinction imply that the culture is a moral person or 
some other kind of entity that we may suitably hold responsible for 
wrongdoing? From the moral point of view, is organizational culture 
less like organizational structure and more like a person? Referring 
back to French's criterion for moral personhood, the answer would 
seem to be no. A culture can experience moral emotions like guilt and 
shame, if at all, only vicariously. Still, one may be drawn to impute 
moral responsibility to organizational cultures more than to organiza-
tional structures because cultures are more suffused with human char-
acter than are structures: we may blame a culture that encourages 
Smith to lie and cheat because that culture expresses the character of 
- perhaps even seems part of- many individuals within the culture 
who lie and cheat. We can more easily anthropomorphize an organi-
zational culture than an organizational structure. 
Yet the fact that we may correctly use some terms of moral ap-
praisal when talking about an organization does not imply that the 
whole range of moral terms applies to it. Some things are subject to 
moral appraisal only in very limited ways. If Smith starts a fight by 
making a nasty remark, I may assess the remark as morally reprehen-
sible while also judging Smith to be reprehensible for making the re-
mark. On the other hand, it makes better sense to blame Smith, not 
the remark, for causing the fight. How the remark itself could be at 
fault or blameworthy is not plain. Hence we must hold open the possi-
bility that organizational culture, while subject to moral appraisal, 
cannot be held responsible for wrongdoing. 
Moreover, even if organizational cultures may be partly responsi-
ble for individual wrongdoing, that woµld not exculpate the individ-
ual. We do not exonerate mobsters merely because they live their lives 
in a culture of violence. Nor can an organizational culture act except 
through individuals, who ultimately bear the praise or blame for the 
lives they craft out of the raw material the culture provides. 
We have now seen that facts such as those of the Air New Zealand 
case do not force us to attribute moral responsibility to the organiza-
tion as a metaphysically distinct entity. But another factor, not em-
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phasized by French or Thompson, might discourage us from insisting 
that the responsibility of an organization ultimately collapses into the 
responsibility of individuals. If we say that humans acting as individu-
als are the ultimate bearers of moral responsibility, we seem to deny 
the moral significance of an individual's organizational involvement. 
Yet when organizational activity causes harm, not merely individuals 
acting in their capacities as participants in the organization are to 
blame for the outcome. The relationship between individuals and the 
organization matters morally. In the case of organizational crime, for 
example, we want to do more than blame each executive involved in 
the relevant decision or perhaps restructure the organization. Our 
blaming practices must somehow reflect the fact that these executives 
engaged in criminal activity as part of a larger enterprise. To ac-
knowledge the moral relevance of the organization, we might blame it 
while also blaming the individuals who form its membership. 
Consider conspiracy law by way of analogy. According to tradi-
tional criminal jurisprudence, stealing something is bad, but agreeing 
with someone else to steal that same thing may be worse, even if 
neither you nor your coconspirator actually steals it.56 Involvement 
with a group for illicit purposes has distinctive moral significance. It 
does not follow, however, that the group as an entity is responsible in 
some way that transcends the responsibility of the individuals. 
Rather, the idea is that those who act in groups may impose greater 
risks on society, and thus deserve greater blame when they act 
wrongly. 
Joining a legal organization is not an evil like joining a conspiracy, 
but both legitimate organizations and criminal conspiracies pose more 
of a threat to social welfare than do their individual members, a threat 
which has implications for the responsibility of those members. One 
of the principal rationales for punishing conspiracy as a separate of-
fense is "the special danger incident to group activity."57 As one oft-
quoted commentary argues, "[I]t is more difficult to guard against the 
antisocial designs of a group of persons than those of an individual 
. . . . The advantages of division of labor and complex organization 
characteristic of modem economic society have their counterparts in 
many forms of criminal activity."58 
56. See generally WAYNER. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. Scorr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW§ 6.4, nt 
530 (2d ed. 1986). 
57. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 comment on criminal conspiracy (Tent. Draft No. 10, 
1960). 
58. Note, The Conspiracy Dilemma: Prosecution of Group Crime, 62 HARV. L. REV. 276, 
283-84 (1948) (footnotes omitted). 
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Obviously, we do not wish to condemn "modem economic soci-
ety" because dangers arise from its "division of labor and complex 
organization." But we may wish to impose on individuals who partici-
pate in that society obligations commensurate with the dangers. After 
all, the converse of the passage we have just quoted is equally true: 
many forms of criminal activity have their counterparts "in the divi-
sion of labor and the complex organization characteristic of modem 
economic society." 
While this comparison highlights the special risks of organiza-
tional activity, it also reminds us that the explicit agreement to do 
wrong found in conspiracies is rarely the source of individual responsi-
bility for organizational wrongdoing. Individual blameworthiness lies 
rather in the failure to respond adequately to the heightened risks of 
unintended and inadvertent wrongdoing. 
In sum, we have identified three distinct reasons that the organiza-
tion must be taken seriously in our practices of fixing blame and attrib-
uting responsibility. First, the corporate structure may be a locus of 
events causally relevant to morally significant harm. Second, organi-
zational culture may serve as both a causal locus for harm and an 
object of moral condemnation. Third, an individual's participation in 
organizational activity involves special risks and imposes special obli-
gations, factors that may deepen responsibility for unintended and in-
advertent wrongs. 
None of these reasons, however, suggests that organizations are 
moral agents of some metaphysically unique type, nor that we can 
blame organizations for their wrongdoing in such a way as to replace 
individual responsibility. Organizational structure may mitigate or 
even excuse individual conduct, but organizational structures cannot 
be the subject of moral blame. Organizational culture may be subject 
to blame in a certain sense, but blaming the culture does not excuse or 
mitigate the conduct of the individuals who are part of it. Finally, 
recognition of the special risks that organizations share with conspira-
cies serves to heighten, not reduce, individual responsibility for organi-
zational wrongdoing. 
Our approach splits the difference between antireductionist and re-
ductionist views of organizations. With the antireductionists, we ac-
knowledge that praising and blaming organizations is not merely a 
shorthand way of praising and blaming individuals. Organizations are 
real and irreducible to their component individuals. With the reduc-
tionists, however, we insist that organizations are not metaphysically 
distinct seats of moral responsibility - persons or otherwise - that 
can absorb the blame from individuals who "know not what they do." 
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Individuals alone have souls to damn, and if the epistemological ex-
cuse relieves them of moral responsibility, then nothing in the world is 
morally responsible. 
C. Strict Moral Liability 
Let us return to Kundera's reflections on the guilt of Czech Com-
munists for the crimes that they committed because they were 
deceived by the Russians. Kundera's protagonist Tomas observes that 
"In the end, the dispute narrowed down to a single question: Did they 
really not know or were they merely making believe?"59 To Tomas, 
however, this seemed a shallow and wrongheaded question: 
It was in this connection that Tomas recalled the tale of Oedipus: 
Oedipus did not know he was sleeping with his own mother, yet when he 
realized what had happened, he did not feel innocent. Unable to stand 
the sight of the misfortunes he had wrought by "not knowing," he put 
out his eyes and wandered blind away from Thebes. 
When Tomas heard Communists shouting in defense of their inner 
purity, he said to himself, As a result of your "not knowing," this coun-
try has lost its freedom, lost it for centuries, perhaps, and you shout that 
you feel no guilt? How can you stand the sight of what you've done? 
How is it you aren't horrified? Have you no eyes to see? If you had eyes, 
you would have to put them out and wander away from Thebesl60 
In Sophocles's drama, a plague visits Thebes because it is harboring 
someone polluted by the twin crimes of parricide and incest. The gods 
do not care if Oedipus did not know that the man he killed at the 
crossroads was his father or that Jocasta was his mother; the gods did 
not care that he had no guilty intentions. Oedipus Rex portrays a 
world of strict moral liability. Kundera wishes us to understand 
moral responsibility among the apparatchiks through the categories of 
this world. 
By analogy, one may approach the problem of fragmented knowl-
edge through a conception of strict moral liability by holding organi-
zational functionaries morally responsible for the wrongs they 
participated in despite the fact that they "didn't know" and thus had 
no wrongful intentions. 
The notion of strict moral liability seems at first blush unpromis-
ing, simply because we typically bridle at blaming someone morally 
for ignorant or unintended wrongs. In this, no doubt, we differ from 
Sophocles and his culture, which placed less emphasis on intentions, 
and indeed on any interior mental states, than we do. Yet even the 
59. KUNDERA, supra note 14, at 176. 
60. Id. at 177. 
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Greeks recognized the excuse, "I didn't realize what I was doing!" 
When Agamemnon apologizes to Achilles in book 9 of the Iliad, he 
attempts to mollify Achilles by explaining that a blindness had come 
over him when he seized Briseis. 61 It is hard to imagine any culture 
for which the agent's intention is simply irrelevant to the moral classi-
fication of acts; as Holmes observed, even a dog knows the difference 
between being tripped over and being kicked. 
A.W.H. Adkins has argued that it was principally in the context of 
wrongful acts involving the religious notion of pollution that the 
Greeks regarded the agent's intentions as irrelevant.62 The notion of 
pollution, however, seems to have no place in a world that does not 
believe in demons, Furies, or vengeful ghosts howling for blood; the 
Greek conception of strict moral liability, so closely tied to cultic and 
chthonic religions, appears to hold little promise for us. Reinforcing 
this conclusion is the fact that the analogous notion of strict liability 
for criminal offenses is widely regarded as a jurisprudential aberration 
with no place in a civilized legal system. 
Yet the argument cannot be quite so quick or straightforward. For 
one thing, the concept of pollution has by no means vanished from 
contemporary, secular moral discourse, as the postwar debate over the 
dimensions of German "metaphysical guilt" makes clear.63 Anthony 
Appiah has noted that many of those advocating Western divestment 
of South African holdings until the end of apartheid base their argu-
ments explicitly on the idea that, regardless of the practical efficacy of 
divestment, possessing South African holdings amounts to a form of 
pollution. 64 Moreover, in recent years moral philosophers have paid 
increasing attention to the phenomenon of moral luck, 65 the possibility 
that matters beyond our control may affect our moral blameworthi-
ness. Philosophers who believe in moral luck must be prepared to 
weaken the requirement of evil intent in attributions of moral blame. 
Finally, as George Fletcher points out, the concept of pollution has 
61. HOMER, THE ILIAD bk. IX, lines 136-45 (Robert Fugles trans., 1990). 
62. ARTHUR W.H. ADKINS, MERIT AND REsPONSIBILITY: A STUDY IN GREEK VALUES 
92-104 (1960). Some acts, such as murder, rendered the perpetrator loathsome in the eyes of the 
gods. One thus polluted could not perform prayers and sacrifices without first undergoing expia-
tion and ritual purification. 
63. See KARL JASPERS, THE QUESfION OF GERMAN GUILT (E.B. Ashton trans., 1947). 
64. Anthony Appiah, Racism and Moral Pollution, 18 PHIL. F. 185 (1987), reprinted in COL-
LECTIVE REsPONSIBILITY: FIVE DECADES OF DEBATE IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ETHICS 
219 (Larry May & Stacey Hoffman eds., 1991). 
65. See, e.g., THOMAS NAGEL, Moral Luck, in MORTAL QUESfIONS 24 (1979); MARTHA c. 
NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LUCK AND ETHICS IN GREEK TRAGEDY AND 
PHILOSOPHY (1986); BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK (1981). 
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survived in our criminal law in forfeiture provisions. 66 Forfeiture of 
goods involved in criminal activity is a residue of the law of deodands, 
which grew out of a tradition of regarding the physical instruments of 
wrongdoing as polluted objects. 67 Deodands, it is true, are a thing of 
the past; but forfeiture remains. All this suggests that the notion of 
strict moral liability may not be as anachronistic, and as bound to 
superstition, as it seems. 
We nevertheless continue to find it an unpromising approach to 
the problem of fragmented knowledge. To begin with, the notion of 
moral pollution simply cannot substitute for the concept of moral 
blameworthiness. Proponents of the concept of pollution face a di-
lemma. If they base their argument, as they seem to, on the fact that 
the concept of pollution persists in our actual practices of moral criti-
cism, they must acknowledge that those practices do not restrict it to 
cases where the agent plays a causal role in wrongdoing. In the para-
digmatic instances of moral pollution - metaphysical guilt, or the 
sense of taint felt by the close relatives of notorious murders - the 
agent's causal role in the wrongdoing is as irrelevant as his intentions. 
German metaphysical guilt, for example, is metaphysical precisely be-
cause it applies even to Germans who played no causal role in the 
Holocaust. 
But decisive reasons exist to reject the concept of noncausal moral 
pollution. Recently, enraged citizens of Auckland, New Zealand 
burned the garage of a murderer's parents. In their anger they evi-
dently regarded the parents as polluted by their son's crime; surely, 
however, such thinking is a terrible moral error. The U.S. Constitu-
tion thus justifiably proscribes punishment by corruption of blood, a 
holdover from the ancient jurisprudence of pollution. The promiscu-
ous use of the noncausal concept of moral pollution is suspect; and it is 
a concept that invites promiscuous use because it simply seems impos-
sible to cabin within precise, or even imprecise, boundaries. If, on the 
other hand, we restrict the concept of pollution to cases where the 
agent played a causal role in wrongdoing, we can no longer base the 
argument on "the normative force of the actual" - the fact that the 
concept of pollution persists in actual practice. In that case, propo-
nents of the concept must justify it. 
Moreover, an analogous objection arises even in many cases where 
the agent did play a causal role in wrongdoing. The secretary who 
printed the address labels for shipments of Dalkon Shields, the clerk 
66. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW§ 5.1, at 347-49 (1978). 
67. Id. 
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who affixed these labels to the boxes, the trucker who delivered them, 
the stevedore who loaded them onto a ship, the UPS driver who deliv-
ered them to physicians' offices, and the physician's receptionist all 
played a causal role in the wrongful distribution of the product. Yet it 
seems outrageous to insist that their causal role in wrongdoing morally 
polluted all these individuals. 
This suggests that if the concept of pollution is to be used at all, it 
demands fine-grained distinctions of degree. One might distinguish, 
for example, between investors (and employees' relatives) who are pol-
luted because they unknowingly benefited from organizational wrong-
doing, employees who are polluted merely by virtue of working for an 
organization involved in wrongdoing, employees who are polluted be-
cause they played an unintentional causal role in the wrongdoing, em-
ployees who are polluted because they knew of the wrongful act and 
did nothing (though they did not participate in it), and employees who 
are polluted because they knowingly or intentionally participated in 
the wrongful act. Ordinarily, we would regard the last category as a 
worse form of pollution than its predecessors; the list proceeds in 
roughly ascending order of pollution. 
If that is the strategy, however, the concept of pollution does not 
solve the problem of fragmented knowledge - it merely restates that 
problem. True, the concept of pollution provides a resource by which 
we can in some sense condemn nonintentional involvements in wrong-
doing. But under conditions of bureaucratic fragmentation of knowl-
edge, the worst form of moral pollution - pollution by intentional 
wrongdoing - seems to disappear, so that bureaucracy seems able to 
conjure it out of existence. Thus, even when the concept of pollution 
fortifies our moral repertoire, bureaucratic fragmentation of knowl-
edge blocks the severest and most characteristic form of moral criti-
cism. That is the problem of fragmented knowledge. 
To summarize, we may either resolve the problem of fragmented 
knowledge by employing an undifferentiated notion of moral pollution 
that is hopelessly overbroad or distinguish gradations of pollutions, in 
which case the problem of fragmented knowledge has merely been re-
stated rather than resolved. 
Let us return to Kundera's example. The most striking fact about 
the Czech Communists he discusses is that they were not simply igno-
rant of what they were doing in the way Oedipus was ignorant when 
he married Jocasta. They were "enthusiasts convinced they had dis-
covered the only road to paradise. They defended that road so val-
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iantly that they were forced to execute many people."68 They had 
embarked on a course of political action that involved recognizable 
moral risks. They knowingly collaborated with a powerful foreign 
power in order to bring their own country under its dominion, bank-
ing on the Soviets' claim to represent the party of humanity. If they 
did not know what they were doing, they should have found out. 
Thus, to analyze Kundera's problem correctly, we should not hold 
the Communists strictly morally liable, like Oedipus. Rather, we must 
understand that they took voluntary part in an organizational enter-
prise engaged in risky business, giving them special and stringent obli-
gations to comprehend the import of their actions. Tomas is right to 
find Did they know or did they not? a "second-rate" question69 - not 
because, as with Oedipus, knowledge is irrelevant, but because the 
right question is Should they have known? Accordingly, we propose to 
give the concept of culpable ignorance a more central role in assigning 
responsibility for organizational wrongdoing. 
D. Extending Individual Responsibility 
The simplest way of extending the concept of culpable ignorance to 
situations in which the knowledge conditions fail is to invoke an anal-
ogy to drunk driving. By the time a driver has had six drinks, he may 
no longer have the reflexes or judgment to avoid an accident, and thus 
in one sense he is not responsible for what he does behind the wheel. 
Obviously, though, we do hold him responsible. Why? The answer 
seems simple enough: although we agree that once he became drunk 
he lost effective control of his actions, we blame him for becoming 
drunk in the first place. Though he was not fully responsible at the 
time of the accident, it was his own fault that he was not responsible. 
In Aristotle's words, "when one has once let go of a stone, it is too late 
to get it back - but the agent was responsible for throwing it, because 
the origin of the action was in himself. "7° 
Analogously, we may agree that individuals in organizational set-
tings often do not know enough to be held responsible for organiza-
tional wrongdoings and yet we insist that they should have known. 
They were wilfully blind. Thus, for example, if an SS officer claimed 
68. KuNDERA, supra note 14, at 176. 
69. Id. at 178. 
70. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. III, ch. v, 1114a, at 124 (J.A.K. Thomson 
trans., rev. ed. 1976). For discussion, see T.H. Irwin, Reason and Responsibility in Aristotle, in 
EssAYS ON ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS 117 (Amelie o. Rorty ed., 1980). For a proposal similar to 
ours, see DENNIS F. THOMPSON, POLIDCAL ETHICS AND PUBLIC OFFICE 60 (1987). Thomp-
son's discussion of what he calls "the moral responsibility of many hands," id. at 40-65, is one of 
the best recent efforts to address the problem of fragmented knowledge. 
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that he did not know about the SS's murderous activities, we may wish 
to insist that his ignorance is blameworthy. He should have known 
what he was joining. 
The drunk driving analogy suggests that we can hold people re-
sponsible for getting into the very predicament that at first glance 
seems to relieve them of responsibility. If we focus on the act of drink-
ing, this suggests that an employee is responsible for the predicament 
he gets into by joining an organization that fragments relevant knowl-
edge. Except in the case of outlaw groups like the SS, however, we do 
not want to treat the act of joining an organization, like the act of 
heavy drinking, as suspect or presumptively wrong. 
We would do better to focus on the driving aspect of the drunk 
driving analogy. Driving is a valuable activity, and our licensing pro-
cedures are designed to make it widely available. Because of the lethal 
potential of the automobile, however, the privilege of driving hinges on 
an exercise of alertness, caution, and self-restraint that we do not re-
quire of pedestrians or passengers. We allow pedestrians and passen-
gers to impair their reflexes and judgment with alcohol, but we treat it 
as a legal and moral offense for a driver or prospective driver to do so. 
Analogously, because of the great potential for harm arising from 
the division oflabor and fragmentation of knowledge in a corporate or 
bureaucratic organization, employees may acquire duties far more de-
manding than doing no evil. They must look and listen for evil and 
attempt to thwart it if they discover it. These duties, however, are not 
as limited and well-defined as those imposed on the driver. We expect 
prospective drivers to ''just say no," but we cannot expect organiza-
tional employees to know everything about the operation in which 
they are involved. While drinking is a gratuitous impediment to driv-
ing, fragmented knowledge inheres in the structure of the organization 
itself. We are left with a question that does not arise in the context of 
drunk driving: What and how much precaution do we require of the 
individual employee? 
We cannot answer this question definitively, but we can begin by 
suggesting several obligations that arise from the specific risk of orga-
nizational enterprise: the risk that an individual will do or contribute 
to great harm without knowing it. 
1. Obligations of investigation. The first, most obvious, possibility 
is to hold individuals in organizational settings morally responsible for 
discerning the nature of their own projects and for discovering what 
other employees are doing with their work products. The idea is obvi-
ous because it remedies the absence of knowledge in the most straight-
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forward way: by demanding that individuals do their best to acquire 
the knowledge they lack. 
2. Obligations of communication. A second possibility is to hold 
individuals who possess troublesome knowledge morally responsible 
for communicating it to others in the organization. Obviously, com-
munication may be a risky course of action: supervisors treasure their 
"deniability," and shooting the messenger is often their knee-;ierk re-
sponse. Yet riskiness does not distinguish this from other moral re-
sponsibilities: we often believe that people have moral obligations to 
act against their self-interest. 
3. Obligations of protection. The previous suggestions imply that 
supervisors may have moral obligations to protect their subordinates 
from adverse consequences of investigation and communication. For 
example, they may be morally responsible for protecting 
whistleblowers from retaliation. 
4. Obligations of prevention. Those in management positions may 
have moral obligations to forestall wrongdoing by setting up structures 
that avoid the problems we have been examining. Such preventive 
mechanisms might include ombudsmen, incentive structures that re-
ward moral action, channels for anonymous information about 
problems, and so on. Interestingly, the American Bar Association's 
1983 ethics code requires supervisors in law firms to take measures 
that ensure that their subordinates behave ethically.71 
5. Obligations of precaution. In some cases, we may be able to 
analogize the act of joining an organization to the act of heavy drink-
ing: the individual knows or should know that once she becomes in-
volved, her discretion and knowledge will be so constricted that she 
cannot be held responsible for wrongdoing that, in broad outline, she 
can reasonably anticipate. The fatal misstep is involving herself in the 
first place. More often than not, would-be employees of organizations 
have some prior sense of the organization's values and culture. We 
may therefore hold individuals responsible for joining the organization 
in the first place, as we might hold an individual German responsible 
for joining the SS. 
That individuals in an organization have obligations like these, and 
that their breach provides a basis for assigning the individuals respon-
sibility for wrongs done in ignorance, seems plausible. But this ap-
proach to extending individual responsibility for organizational 
wrongdoing raises two critical questions. First, how demanding are 
71. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.1 (1983); see also John Braithwaite, 
Enforced Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime Control, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1466 
(1982). 
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these obligations? There are some things we could not have learned, 
communicated, or prevented even by the most vigilant inquiry, and if 
should have does not imply could have, we are back to strict liability. 
Second, how much vigilance is enough? The standard for liability can 
be onerous even if it is not strict. 
As we have described them, the moral obligations of the individual 
employee seem to fall somewhere between perfect duties like not kill-
ing, with fairly precise boundaries, and imperfect duties like charity or 
self-improvement, that require only some indeterminate effort. If we 
attempt to make these duties perfect, through more precise formula-
tion, we risk defining them too narrowly; if we attempt to make them 
imperfect, by demanding a "reasonable" effort, we risk making them 
too vague. 
Similar questions arise in settings where the law recognizes an af-
firmative duty to prevent harm: where the agent has a special duty to 
care for the victim, has contributed to the victim's peril, has initiated 
rescue, or has a responsibility to control the threatened harm. In these 
settings, we hold the agent culpable for not trying to prevent harm, 
but not strictly liable for its occurrence. This leaves the question of 
how much of an attempt to prevent harm the agent must make. Legal 
norms are hard to discover, because few courts actually recognize a 
duty to aid, and in the cases where they do, the defendant has usually 
failed to make even a token effort to render assistance. 72 
This may be more problematic when assigning criminal than moral 
responsibility, since the notice requirement of criminal law compels us 
to draw a clear line between required and merely permitted assist-
ance. 73 One might think that moral appraisal could tolerate more 
vagueness. Why should a conscientious agent need a sharp line be-
tween required and supererogatory precautions rather than an indefi-
nite duty to be as cautious and vigilant as possible? If we treat the 
fulfillment of these duties as a matter of degree, however, we raise the 
problem of deciding how the degree of fulfillment affects the individ-
ual's responsibility for organizational wrongs that greater effort might 
have averted. 
This raises the second question: What is an individual responsible 
for in failing to fulfill these preemptive duties, as we shall call the obli-
gations of inv~tigation, communication, protection, and precaution? 
72. See FLETCHER, supra note 66, § 8.3.7. 
73. When the criminal law imposes liability for unintended harm, it usually requires gross 
negligence or recklessness - conscious disregard of a risk. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CoDE 
§ 2.02(d) (1985) (culpability requires negligence constituting "a gross deviation from the stan· 
dard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation"). 
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Should we blame her only for the breach of the preemptive duty, or 
should we blame her for the resulting offense as if she had known all 
the relevant facts (and thus hold her immune from censure if no harm 
results)? Is the employee responsible just for failing to investigate (at 
the time she fails to do so), or does she lose her excuse of ignorance 
with respect to any facts the investigation would have yielded? 
Neither approach seems fully satisfactory. In limiting responsibil-
ity to the breach of preemptive duties, we impose the same blame or 
punishment regardless of what wrongs result; in withholding the ex-
cuse of ignorance for the offense, we treat a negligent employee as if 
she were responsible for intentional wrongdoing. And if we assign re-
sponsibility only when a wrong is actually done, we fail to censure 
those lucky enough to ignore their special obligations without adverse 
effect. 
This dilemma is hardly peculiar to the problem of organizational 
settings, however. We display much the same ambivalence about as-
signing blame for the variable consequences of individual agency. Le-
gally and morally, we are torn between a desire to make agents with 
the same mental state equally culpable and an urge to consider the 
consequences in assigning blame. Moreover, while we condemn those 
who fail in their deliberate efforts to bring about wrongs almost as 
severely as those who succeed, we condemn those who risk doing 
wrong without intending it far more severely when the wrong is actu-
ally done. 
But denying the excuse of ignorance to those who do not fulfill 
their preemptive duties in organizations raises special problems. By 
denying employees the epistemological excuse, we rest their fault on 
events beyond their control; we effectively treat them as if they inten-
tionally engaged in serious wrongdoing of which they were in fact ig-
norant. If this is harsh legally, it is unacceptable morally. One can 
hardly imagine how any level of negligence in failing to investigate the 
possibility of wrongdoing could be the moral equivalent of intention-
ally doing the wrong. 
Moreover, other agents will often do the wrong the employee fails 
to avert. If we held an employee responsible for others' wrongdoing 
he could have prevented, just as if he had intentionally approved or 
encouraged that wrongdoing, we would greatly increase the scope of 
his responsibility and the sway of moral luck. We would impose on 
him a moral responsibility as great as the legal responsibility we now 
reserve for co-conspirators, based on their explicit agreement to pur-
sue a criminal venture. 
Finally, as we noted earlier, the fact that the obligations we have 
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described are indeterminate in their extent and stringency exacerbates 
the tension. To say to a manager that she should have done more to 
prevent her employees' wrongdoing, or to an employee that she should 
have blown the whistle on her boss despite the risk, is one thing. It is 
quite another thing to say that as a result of having failed to do 
enough, or of having caved in to an insufficiently grave threat, the 
individual is now responsible for serious wrongdoing as if she had in-
tentionally engaged in it. 
Several writers on criminal jurisprudence have suggested that in 
order to assign responsibility appropriately, we need to view the indi-
vidual's actions in a consistently broad "time-frame" - to look not 
only at the actus reus defined by statute but also at the actions and 
decisions leading up to it, particularly those that promote, mitigate, 
excuse, or justify the act's commission. In the most fully developed 
proposal of this kind, Paul Robinson has argued that the law can rec-
ognize a person's responsibility for getting into a predicament without 
denying her the excuse created by that predicament. 74 The critical 
inquiry is whether, in acting in a way that creates an excuse, the indi-
vidual is at fault for the offense excused. 
To return to the drunk driving analogy, a driver who drank until 
he was no longer able to appreciate the hazards of the road would not 
lose the excuse of ignorance if an accident occurred, as if he had know-
ingly caused the accident. Rather, he would be guilty of reckless 
homicide for disregarding the risk of a fatal accident; if he should have 
known of the risk but remained ignorant (e.g., because he did not 
bother to find out that the punch he was drinking was highly alco-
holic), he would be guilty of negligent homicide. 75 
Applied to organizational wrongdoing, an approach like Robin-
son's would ground the employee's responsibility for the harm in her 
preemptive duties to investigate, prevent, and so forth. By breaching 
these duties, the employee has played a role in causing or contributing 
to the commission of the offense. The key question would not be 
whether the employee deliberately, recklessly, or negligently breached 
74. Paul H. Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One's Own Defense: A Study in the Limits 
of Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine, 71 VA. L. REV. 1 (1985). 
75. Similarly, if a person negligently provoked another to use deadly force, he would not lose 
his right to kill in self-defense. If he exercised that right, however, he would be guilty of negli-
gent homicide for creating the need for self-defense. If he provoked another in order to give 
himself a legal justification for killing that person, he would be guilty of intentional homicide. 
To bear any responsibility for the ultimate offense, the agent must be at fault for creating the 
specific excusing or justifying condition he relies on. If he negligently provoked someone without 
reason to expect that she would resort to deadly force, he would not be guilty of homicide in 
creating the need for self-defense. He would be responsible at most for negligent provocation and 
the use of nondeadly defensive force. 
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her duty but whether, by failing to perform it, she intentionally, reck-
lessly, or negligently facilitated the wrongdoing. 
Thus, if an employee should have known that by investigating a 
new project before it commenced, she could ascertain whether it in-
volved exporting toxic substances, and there was some reason to sus-
pect that it might, she would be responsible for negligently exporting 
those substances, even if, by the time she exported them, the most 
diligent inquiry would not have revealed their toxic character. Had 
she actually known that an investigation could have revealed that in-
formation, but failed to investigate, she would be responsible for reck-
lessly exporting toxic substances, even if, by the time she exported 
them, she was no longer able to ascertain their toxic character. 
In some cases, this approach may lead us to hold employees who 
act in ignorance responsible for intentional wrongdoing. If the em-
ployee deliberately insulated herself from knowledge about the ex-
ports, intending to export toxic substances without being told that 
specific exports were toxic, she would be responsible for their inten-
tional export despite her ignorance at the time she exported them. But 
if she deliberately insulated herself from such knowledge only because 
she hated confrontations, she would be responsible for no more than 
reckless export, since she did not know the character of the substances 
or intend or hope that they might be toxic. This approach, then, 
avoids the harshness of denying an employee an excuse for organiza-
tional wrongdoing if she has any fault for creating the excuse. It treats 
her as responsible for wrongdoing only to the extent that she is at fault 
for excusing or justifying its commission. 
Applying this approach to organizational wrongdoing, however, 
involves complexities. In the examples Robinson discusses, a person 
gives himself an excuse of ignorance by an action that impairs his abil-
ity to obtain information critical to the safe performance of his task: a 
driver drinks himself insensible, a police officer leaves his glasses home 
when he goes on duty. In such cases, the risks of acting in the im-
paired condition seem obvious; to regard the driver or police officer as 
reckless in disregarding those risks makes sense. But the risks of pro-
ceeding in ignorance may not be so obvious in an organizational set-
ting. Those risks depend on what the organization does, what it can 
or might do wrong, and how the employee's own action can or might 
contribute to those wrongs. Acquiring this background knowledge 
may itself require extensive inquiry, and the question then becomes 
what should trigger such an inquiry. The strength of the employee's 
preemptive duties will depend on the risks they serve to preempt, but 
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the employee may not be able to appreciate those risks without having 
already fulfilled those duties. 
When we consider this problem less abstractly, we do not face a 
regress or a bootstrap. We merely face the need to condition the du-
ties we impose on what the (prospective) employee knows or should 
know at the outset about the organization, its work, and her role in it. 
For example, an employee's duty of investigation and precaution will 
be much greater if she has heard rumors that the import-export busi-
ness to which she has applied is a CIA front, or if she knows that 
similar businesses in that part of the world have often been used as 
CIA fronts. Because so much depends on what the employee knew or 
should have known, suspected or should have suspected, at various 
times, we must be very cautious in assigning individual responsibility 
for organizational wrongdoing. Frankly, we will often lack the infor-
mation necessary to do so. But such epistemic limits to faultfinding 
are hardly unique to the organizational setting. 
The devices we have suggested for extending individual responsi-
bility may be too demanding because they require a debilitating level 
of caution, wariness, and investigation in routine organization work. 
Alternatively, they may fail to justify the ascription of responsibility to 
individuals in many common organizational settings. But until the at-
tempt has been made to broaden and adapt the notion of individual 
responsibility, news of its death will be premature. 
CONCLUSION 
The preemptive obligations we are proposing have in recent years 
become widely accepted in both public and private bureaucracies. 
Governmental agencies typically have ombudsmen, and state and fed-
eral governments have enacted protections for whistleblowers. In the 
wake of several incidents, the Exxon Corporation has enacted regula-
tions requiring employees who notice possible misconduct or danger-
ous situations to notify their superiors in writing; the superiors, in 
turn, are required to respond in writing, and if no written response is 
forthcoming, the employee must jump the chain of command and in-
form higher-level executives. 76 
Regarded as public policy proposals, our preemptive obligations 
are already found in corporate manuals and memoranda. We are not 
offering a proposal for regulations whose time has come, however, but 
an account of individual moral responsibility. That is, we argue not 
only that bureaucratic organizations should institute policies along the 
76. We owe our information about Exxon's regulations to John Braithwaite. 
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lines we have suggested, but also that individual executives within the 
organizations are morally blameworthy for failing to implement such 
policies and that individual employees and executives are morally 
blameworthy for violating preemptive obligations even in the absence 
of policies implementing them. 
The latter point is particularly significant, because it implicates the 
moral culture of organizations as well as their formal policies. One 
could imagine an organization enacting Exxon-style regulations while 
preserving a moral culture that discouraged the whistleblowing that 
the regulations require; in that case, employees would fear to go over 
their supervisors' heads, and the regulations would function primarily 
to insure that lower- or middle-level employees took the fall when 
things went wrong.77 To insist as we do that the preemptive obliga-
tions form part of our moral responsibilities is to insist on the spirit as 
well as the letter of preemptive regulations. 
Thus, our proposal amounts to a reconfiguration of the dimensions 
of individual moral responsibility as well as a reconfiguration of the 
structure and culture of bureaucratic organizations. Earlier, we ar-
gued that familiar moral theories cannot handle the problem of frag-
mented knowledge. Not only do their first-order precepts presuppose 
the four knowledge conditions, but they typically marginalize the phe-
nomenon of culpable ignorance. We conclude with some brief reflec-
tions on how our proposal differs from these familiar moral theories. 
The account we propose retains the concentric-circles structure of 
familiar moral theories: a core of first-order precepts; a surrounding 
layer of mitigations and excuses; and an outer layer of conditions de-
feating those mitigations and excuses. In effect, the modification we 
propose relocates the notion of culpable ignorance from the category 
of conditions defeating mitigations and excuses to the first-order 
precepts. That is, we place preemptive obligations among the basic 
moral duties of the individual in bureaucratic settings. In one sense, 
then, our proposal may be regarded as a minor modification, or 
friendly amendment, to familiar accounts of morality. 
In another sense, however, the change is fundamental, for it in-
volves a different model of the moral life. Traditional moral theories 
presuppose an episodic or picaresque model: the moral life consists of 
77. John Braithwaite has reported that American pharmaceutical company executives re-
peatedly told him in interviews that someone's job was "vice-president responsible for going to 
jail": his duty was to take the fall for his superiors, and after several years in this position he 
would be rewarded by moving to a well-compensated "safe" job. See Braithwaite, supra note 29, 
at 3. In s~ch an institutional culture it is hardly farfetched to assume that Exxon-style regula-
tions might be instituted for purposes of liability screening rather than avoiding fragmented 
knowledge. 
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a progression of discrete trials or encounters, in which the individual 
confronts a temptation or a difficult choice and marshals her virtue 
and willpower to meet the challenge. Between these episodes of 
heightened moral tension and challenge, life proceeds more tranquilly, 
in a state of comparative moral neutrality. From the labors of Hercu-
les to the voyage of Odysseus to the progress of Bunyan's Pilgrim, the 
basic stories of the West have pictured the moral life as a kind of er-
rantry. Roberto Unger has described this view of moral encounter as 
the "Christian-romantic view of the self,"78 by which he means to sug-
gest not only that Christianity adapted the pagan literary form of the 
romance but that this form is the deepest expression of how we mor-
ally conceive of our lives. Plainly, the episodic form of the moral life 
requires the four knowledge conditions, whose satisfaction permits us 
to recognize that the next moral test has come upon us. Our argu-
ment, however, has been that discrete and bounded episodes of moral 
challenge arise in a moral world far different from that of the bureau-
cratic organizations in which modem men and women lead their lives. 
Moving the preemptive obligations to the core precepts of morality 
does more than reblend the wine in old bottles; it changes how we 
understand the moral life. We now see ourselves not as individual 
souls, progressing from one moral episode to the next, but as members 
of organizations in a continuous but changing network of involve-
ments. We now see moral encounters not simply as tests of will and 
virtue in the face of known and defined obstacles, but as a part of the 
continual effort to position ourselves in a state of clarity where knowl-
edge and definition at last become possible. The comprehension that 
we stand at a moral crossroads is not given, but acquired through con-
siderable effort, courage, and even luck. Obtaining that knowledge is a 
moral challenge coequal to, or perhaps greater than, the challenge of 
responding to it. 
Indeed, the organizational setting changes the contours of moral 
challenge and thus of moral virtue. Because of the division of respon-
sibility in organizations, responding to a clearly presented choice may 
be less demanding than the episodic view suggests, for others are there 
to share our burden. Recall that in the Milgram experiments it proved 
easier to resist the wrongful demand when others resisted with the 
subject. However, because of the fragmentation of knowledge in orga-
nizations, coming to understand that one faces a clearly presented 
moral choice may be more demanding than the episodic view suggests; 
it may require considerable personal courage and persistence. Our 
78. ROBERTO M. UNGER, PASSION: AN EssAY ON PERSONALITY 24 (1984). 
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moral trials may be less intense but more protracted; if we are heroes, 
we will be heroes by virtue of the quantity rather than the quality of 
our efforts. The institutionalization of everyday life may demand 
fewer of the virtues of a soldier or saint and more of the virtues of a 
detective, a scientist, or a trial lawyer aiming to reconstruct shards of 
evidence into a coherent theory. 
That takes us back to Kafka. In its form, The Trial seems like a 
picaresque novel in which Joseph K. progresses from one episodic en-
counter to the next. At each stage, however, the moral test in the 
encounter is the same: can Joseph K. fend off distraction and obfusca-
tion to learn what he is accused of and what he can do about it? His 
trial, on our account, consists precisely of this repeated test, and his 
crime consists of his failure to meet the challenge. His obligation is to 
find his way through a nightmare of fragmented knowledge: to reas-
semble the misshapen pieces of his experience into a picture that tells 
him at last where he stands in the order of guilt and innocence. Under 
our view of morality, Joseph K.'s predicament is ours. His failure is 
our failure as well. 
